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Epistemic justifi cation is necessary for deliberative democracy, yet there 
is a question about what we mean by the concept of epistemic values 
of public deliberation. According to one reading, the epistemic value 
of public deliberation implies a procedure’s ability to achieve a correct 
outcome, as judged by a procedure-independent standard of correctness. 
As I shall show in this paper, however, there is another reading of the 
"epistemic" value of public deliberation extant in the literature: Epis-
temic values are constitutive of a deliberative process as an exchange of 
reasons. If the distinction between two concepts of epistemic values of 
public deliberation holds, then we can re-conceptualize the relationship 
between procedural fairness, epistemic values, and legitimacy. Thus, a 
concept of legitimacy that combines procedural fairness and a proce-
dure-independent standard of correctness on the one hand, versus one 
that combines procedural fairness and the constitutive epistemic value 
of deliberation on the other hand.
Keywords: Deliberative democracy, epistemic democracy, demo-
cratic legitimacy, epistemic proceduralism.
Legitimacy is one of the central normative concepts for deliberative 
democracy because decisions must be mutually justifi able to all.1 The 
l egitimacy of decisions is a function of procedural and epistemic dimen-
sions.2 While there is a tendency to regard the procedural and epis-
1 The literature in deliberative democracy is extensive. For good overviews, see 
Bohman and Rehg (1997), Chambers (2003), Marti and Besson (2006), Thompson 
(2008), Mansbridge et. al. (2012), Owen and Smith (2015). For statements about the 
centrality of legitimacy in deliberative democracy, see Cohen (1997a), Habermas 
(1996), Chambers (2003), Thompson (2008), Dryzek (2010), and Mansbridge et. al. 
(2012), among others.
2 Let me clarify why I am using the “procedural and epistemic” distinction 
here. I am referring to procedural and epistemic justifi cations of democracy. For 
example, Estlund (2008) argues against pure proceduralist theories of democracy 
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temic dimensions as mutually exclusive categories of justifi cation, re-
cent literature suggests novel ways to combine those categories.3 This 
essay addresses one strand of the multifaceted debates over the rela-
tionship between epistemology and democracy4, namely the relation-
and pure epistemic theories of democracy, ultimately arriving at his favored theory 
of “epistemic proceduralism.” Another example is Peter (2008) who argues against 
pure proceduralist views and instrumental theories of epistemic democracy such as 
Dewey’s pragmatic view, ultimately arriving at pure epistemic proceduralism. Thus, 
I do not believe that the procedural and epistemic distinction vis-à-vis democratic 
legitimacy is unwarranted. However, I acknowledge that the usual and more 
familiar distinction is between procedural and substantive on the one hand and 
moral and epistemic on the other hand. The procedural and substantive distinction 
on the one hand is commonplace in political and legal philosophy. In the deliberative 
democracy literature, Cohen’s (1997b) classic paper, “Procedure and Substance in 
Deliberative Democracy” is about that. Also, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) make a 
distinction between procedure and substance, where they give three procedural and 
three substantive conditions of deliberative democracy. The moral and epistemic 
distinction is also used in the literature. Morality refers to the rightness or goodness 
of actions and epistemic refers to knowledge and truth. Fricker (2007), for example, 
discusses the moral and epistemic dimensions of injustice.
3 For theories combining procedural and epistemic elements into democratic 
legitimacy include Chambers (2017), Estlund (1997) and (2008), Kelly (2012), 
Landemore (2012) and (2017), MacGilvray (2014), Misak and Talisse, (2014), 
Mladenović (2020), Muirhead (2016), Peter (2007), (2008), and (2010). I have 
developed a theory that combines procedural and epistemic dimensions of democratic 
legitimacy in Min (2014) and (2016). The main arguments in this paper are owed 
to Min (2014). In deliberative democracy literature, there is an agreement that 
democratic legitimacy is intimately tied to the epistemic quality of deliberation and its 
outcomes. Deliberative democrats express the relationship between legitimacy and 
the epistemic quality of deliberation in various ways. Cohen writes that “outcomes 
are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and 
reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a: 77). Habermas writes that “The 
democratic principle states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can 
meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn 
has been legally constituted” (Habermas 1996: 110). Mansbridge et al. (2012) writes, 
“the last several decades have seen growing agreement among political theorists 
and empirical political scientists that the legitimacy of a democracy depends in 
part on the quality of deliberation that informs citizens and their representatives” 
(Mansbridge et. al. 2012). They all express the basic point that the legitimacy of 
democracy depends, in part, on the quality (rational) of deliberation (Peter 2010). 
Chambers (2017) expresses this point even more strongly: “deliberative democracy 
ties legitimacy to the twin values of epistemic quality and equal participation” 
(Chambers 2017: 9).
4 There are three main issues in the epistemology and democracy (or epistemic 
democracy for short) literature. The fi rst issue concerns democratic legitimacy and 
authority. This is the topic of this paper. The second issue concerns the problem of 
epistocracy. Epistocracy is a political regime type that authorizes the wise to rule 
over the many. Various epistocratic proposals have been suggested in the history 
of political thought, beginning with Plato. More tempered versions can be found 
in Brennan (2016), Lippman (1925), Mill (1991), Schumpeter (1950). The part of 
the motivation for epistemic defenses of democracy is to overcome epistocracy. For 
important responses to epistocracy, see Estlund (2008), Landemore (2012), and 
Lafont (2020), among others. The third issue concerns the epistemic mechanisms, 
such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem, 
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ship between the procedural and epistemic dimensions of democracy 
vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy.5
This paper argues that there are two concepts of the epistemic value 
of public deliberation in deliberative democracy literature, and recog-
nizing this difference will help us to think more carefully about demo-
cratic legitimacy. I argue for this thesis in four steps. First, two con-
cepts of the epistemic value of public deliberation exist in the current 
literature. The strong concept entails a procedure’s ability to achieve a 
correct outcome, as judged by a procedure-independent standard of cor-
rectness. The weak concept entails a procedure’s ability to facilitate an 
exchange of reasons. Second, I consider two prominent epistemic theo-
ries of democratic legitimacy. David Estlund argues that democratic 
legitimacy is a function of a procedure’s ability to produce correct deci-
sions, as judged by a procedure-independent standard of correctness. 
Estlund’s view combines a strong concept with democratic legitimacy. 
Fabienne Peter argues that democratic legitimacy is a function of a 
procedure’s intrinsic and constitutive epistemic values. Peter’s view 
combines the weak concept with democratic legitimacy. In my view, 
both Estlund’s and Peter’s theories, if combined, provide a sophisti-
cated defense of democratic legitimacy. Combining these two theories, 
however, requires us to make a distinction between the two dimensions 
of lawmaking. Thus, I make a distinction between the enactment and 
long-run dimensions of legitimate lawmaking. Third, the enactment 
dimension refers to the point when laws are made in the constitutional 
order. The long-run dimension refers to the evaluation of laws after the 
enactment of its effectiveness.
Fourth, I combine the two concepts of the epistemic value of public 
deliberation and two dimensions of legitimate lawmaking in the follow-
ing ways. The fi rst combination is between the weak concept and the 
enactment phase of legitimate lawmaking. I argue that a deliberative 
procedure has weak epistemic values if an exchange of reasons is pub-
lic know ledge among all citizens. It produces an understanding of the 
reasons for citizens as political and epistemic agents. The procedure 
not only generates reasons as political and epistemic agents, but it is 
also conducive to mutual respect. Thus, the legitimacy of laws at the 
enactment phase is primarily a function of what survives a delibera-
tive procedure and the resulting laws acceptable to citizens. The second 
combination is between the strong concept and the long run phase of 
legitimate lawmaking. I argue that a deliberative procedure has strong 
epistemic values if a procedure-independent standard of correctness 
reliability, et cetera. For this issue, see Anderson (2006), Kelly (2012), List and 
Goodin (2001), Marti (2006), Talisse (2009), and Goodin and Spiekermann (2018).
5 This essay does not ask if democracy can be legitimate or what is the best 
way to legitimize democracy. In other words, I will not engage with philosophical 
anarchism nor review the well-treaded theories of legitimacy. This essay engages 
in a narrower question: if democracy can be justifi ed on procedural and epistemic 
grounds, which theory is the best one to pursue this line of reasoning?
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is part of its evaluation of laws. Although laws surviving a delibera-
tive procedure are legitimate at enactment, laws should be evaluated 
for their long-run consequences. The evaluation of the long-run con-
sequences requires a procedure-independent standard of correctness. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of laws, in the long run, is primarily a func-
tion of satisfying the epistemic criteria of evaluation of consequences.
1. Stron g and weak epistemic value 
of public deliberation
In this section, I show that two concepts of the epistemic value of public 
deliberation exist in the current literature in epistemic and delibera-
tive democracy.6 The fi rst concept of the epistemic value of public de-
liberation implies a procedure’s ability to achieve a correct outcome, 
as judged by a procedure-independent standard of correctness. Let us 
call this the strong epistemic value of public deliberation.7 There is a 
diversity of sources for this concept, but Joshua Cohen’s conception of 
epistemic democracy is the locus classicus of this literature: 
An epistemic interpretation of voting has three main elements: (1) an inde-
pendent standard of correct decisions – that is, an account of justice or of the 
common good that is independent of current consensus and the outcomes 
of votes; (2) a cognitive account of voting – that is, the view that voting 
expresses beliefs about what the correct policies are according to the inde-
pendent standard, not personal preferences for policies; and (3) an account 
of decision-making as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments 
that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the correct answer 
6 The concept “epistemic” and its cognates refer to truth, justifi cation, reason, 
reason-giving, knowledge pooling, knowledge production, knowledge transmission, 
and so forth. Philosophers make fi ne distinctions between concepts, and I 
demonstrate that there are two concepts of the epistemic value of public deliberation 
extant in the literature. I owe the distinction between the strong and weak concept 
of epistemic to Goldman (1988), but obviously appropriating the idea for my purpose. 
According to Goldman, the strong justifi cation refers to S believing that p only if p 
is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. S is weakly justifi ed in believing 
that p only if S has a good reason to believe p. By “two concepts of the epistemic 
value of public deliberation,” I am distinguishing between ‘concept’ and ‘conceptions’ 
of ‘epistemic value of public deliberation.’ There are two concepts of the epistemic 
value of public deliberation, strong and weak, but there might be multiple strong 
and weak conceptions. The distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ comes from 
Rawls who writes that it is “natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct 
from the various conceptions of justice and as being specifi ed by the role which these 
different sets of principles, these different conceptions, have in common.” (Rawls 
1971: 5–6). One might object that the distinction between the strong and weak 
concepts of epistemic value of public deliberation already exists in the literature by 
way of perfect/imperfect proceduralism on the one hand, and pure proceduralism, on 
the other hand. The purpose of this paper is to draw that distinction to some logical 
conclusions.
7 It is worth noting that most deliberative democratic theorists connect the 
concept epistemic with such an objective standard of correctness (Estlund 2008; 
Peter 2008).
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that is provided by the beliefs of others.  Thus, the epistemic conception 
treats processes of decision-making as, potentially, rational processes of the 
formation of common judgments. (Cohen 1986)
Based on Cohen’s description, we can extract three theses for epistemic 
democracy. The fi rst is political cognitivism, which is a thesis that there 
are true or false answers or better or worse decisions in politics (Lande-
more 2012, 2017). The second is that there are true or false answers to 
politics presupposes a procedure-independent standard of correctness, 
that is other than rational consensus or consent.
Based on these two theses, the third thesis is that democratic pro-
cedure “tracks the truth” better than its alternatives. According to List 
and Goodin:
For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth.’ For 
them, democracy is more desirable than alternative forms of decision-mak-
ing because, and insofar as, it does that.  One democratic decision rule is 
more desirable than another according to that same standard, so far as epis-
temic democrats are concerned. (List and Goodin 2001: 277)
Fabienne Peter articulates the conceptual connection between an inde-
pendent standard of correctness and truth-tracking:
By the standard account I shall denote any characterization of epistemic 
democracy which centers on the truth-tracking potential of democratic 
decision-making processes, and in which truth refers to a procedure-inde-
pendent standard of correctness. According to such accounts, there exists, 
independently of the actual decision-making process, a correct decision – for 
example the one that “truly” realizes justice, or the one that is the “true” 
common good – and the legitimacy of democratic decisions depends, at least 
in part, on the ability of the decision-making process to generate the correct 
outcome. (Peter 2008: 33–4)
The most prominent articulation of the truth tracking capacity of de-
liberation is demonstrated by Landemore (2012), who suggests that 
deliberation can make correct decisions by harnessing the cognitive 
diversity of citizens. Aristotle, the earliest exponent of the ‘wisdom of 
the crowd’ thesis, argues that deliberation among all is epistemically 
superior to deliberation among the few.8
The second concept of the epistemic value of public deliberation 
implies that the epistemic value is intrinsic to and constitutive of a 
procedure as an exchange of reasons. Let us call this the weak epis-
temic value of public deliberation. Again, there is a diversity of sources 
for this concept, but we can fi nd traces of this concept in at least two 
places. Joshua Cohen, in his classic article on democratic legitimacy, 
writes about the common good:
8 Aristotle (1998). This insight has also been argued by Rawls: “The benefi ts of 
discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge 
and the ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can 
make all the same inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of 
combining knowledge and enlarging the range of arguments” (Rawls 1971: 358–9).
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…[T]he relevant conceptions of the common good are not comprised simply 
of interests and preferences that are antecedent to deliberation. Instead, the 
interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common good are those that 
survive deliberation… (Cohen 1997a: 77. Emphasis mine)
“The ideals that comprise the common good,” thus, “are those that sur-
vive” a rational deliberative procedure. In other words, the ideals of 
the common good are constructed through a deliberative process. In a 
different passage, Cohen argues, “Outcomes are legitimate if and only 
if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among 
equals” (Cohen 1997a: 73). Cohen ties the legitimacy of outcomes to 
properties of the deliberative procedure, such as equality, freedom, and 
rationality. Cohen’s ideal proceduralism recognizes that the overall 
quality of deliberation matters, but he defi nes what a good outcome 
is solely on procedural considerations. Cohen’s version of ideal delib-
erative proceduralism could endorse the second interpretation of the 
epistemic value of public deliberation because  the ideals grounding 
deliberative values, such as the common good, are constructed within 
a deliberative procedure and do not refer to a procedure-independent 
standard. In short, the true common good is constitutive of what sur-
vives an ideal deliberation.
More recently, Simone Chambers (2017) argues that that the epis-
temic ideal of reason-giving has always been with deliberative democ-
racy. Reason giving in deliberative democracy – giving reasons that all 
could accept – captures the moral requirement of treating citizens as 
equals. It also captures the epistemic ideals of improving the epistemic 
quality of decisions. She argues that the “criterion of procedurally-inde-
pendent standard of correct outcome is not the best way to conceptual-
ize that epistemic dimension of much of deliberative democracy because 
so much of that dimension is invested in good procedures” (Chambers 
2017: 63). Instead, she proposes the feedback loop between the system 
and the lifeworld, citizens and institutions, and between lay knowledge 
and social scientifi c knowledge, as the basis of a good procedure.
In short, I have demonstrated that there are two concepts of the 
epistemic value of public deliberation operative in the literature. First, 
epistemic values come from a procedure’s ability to achieve a correct 
outcome, as judged by a procedure-independent standard of correct-
ness. Second, epistemic values are intrinsic and constitutive features 
of a procedure as an exchange of reasons.
2. Hybrid views
Legitimacy is one of the central normative concepts for deliberative 
democracy because of the fundamental belief that any laws or policies 
must be mutually justifi able to all. The normative conception of legiti-
macy – as opposed to the empirical conception that refers to the psy-
chological acceptance of a rule – regards the moral permissibility of a 
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regime’s use of coercive power.9 Although there is a diversity of views 
and interpretations of what it means to have democratic legitimacy, let 
me focus on David Estlund’s and Fabienne Peter’s views, as their views 
are the most developed in this arena.10
David Estlund, in his groundbreaking book Democratic Author-
ity, argues that democracy tends to produce correct or just decisions 
better than random, and it is better than non-democratic alternatives 
acceptable from the standpoint of public reason. Estlund’s idea is that 
democracy is epistemically superior to all other political arrangements 
that are fair. Since fairness can be achieved procedurally, Estlund’s 
theory appeals to both procedural and epistemic considerations. He 
denies that purely procedural considerations are suffi cient to judge 
the legitimacy of the outcome; instead, he argues that procedure-inde-
9 In the legitimacy literature, there is a tendency to separate legitimacy from 
authority. Legitimacy means the moral permissibility to enforce a system of rules, 
whereas authority means the moral right to rule and a corresponding duty to obey. 
For this essay, I only discuss legitimacy. When it comes to legitimacy, philosophers 
usually make a distinction between normative and descriptive legitimacy. Descriptive 
legitimacy is the psychological acceptance of a ruling regime. Normative legitimacy 
is the moral permissibility to use coercive power. In the domain of normative 
legitimacy, there are three types of views. Here I follow Habermas (1996) where he 
articulates the three normative models of democratic legitimacy. The fi rst view is 
the liberal view, whose progenitors are Hobbes and Locke. For the Lockean view, 
see Simmons (2008). The second type is the civic republican version of Rousseau. 
For the republican view, see Pettit (2012). The third type is deliberative theories of 
legitimacy that can be found in Benhabib (1994); Chambers (2003); Cohen (1997a); 
Dryzek (2010); Habermas (1996); Lafont (2014) and (2020); Manin (1987); Thompson 
(2008).
10 I chose David Estlund’s and Fabienne Peter’s accounts of democratic legitimacy 
vis-à-vis the epistemic value of public deliberation because their views, to the best 
of my knowledge, are the most comprehensive and thoroughly developed in this 
area. I decided to engage with their earlier works, Estlund (2008) and Peter (2007), 
(2008), and (2010), because while each philosopher has advanced well past thinking 
about democratic legitimacy, their earlier works are most relevant to the topic of 
this paper. Estlund’s latest writings focus on the role of ideal theory in political 
philosophizing. His latest book, Utopophobia, is an attempt at such theorizing. See 
Estlund (2020). Peter, to the best of my knowledge, is still expounding her powerful 
views on political legitimacy. However, the focus has changed to broader issues in 
political philosophy and social epistemology. For instance, her (2013) paper discusses 
peer disagreement and the relevance of the second personal standpoint to illuminate 
what it means when peers disagree in epistemic and practical deliberations. Her 
(forthcoming) paper, “Epistemic Norms of Political Deliberation,” is primarily 
about how well-ordered epistemic norms of political deliberation contributes to 
the political legitimacy of deliberative democracy. It is primarily about epistemic 
norms, including “procedural epistemic norms” (see section 6 of that paper), and only 
derivative about how the procedural epistemic norms affect political legitimacy. Her 
(forthcoming) paper combines the instrumental benefi ts (vis-à-vis, epistemic benefi ts) 
of public deliberation with procedural epistemic norms. This view is philosophically 
interesting and worth contending with. However, that would be outside the scope 
of this paper. Moreover, combining the two still requires a distinction between the 
two concepts of the epistemic value of public deliberation and the two phases of 
legitimate lawmaking.
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pendent epistemic norms must be met, and fair procedures followed if 
democratic outcomes are to be judged legitimate.
Fabienne Peter, in a series of papers, proposes an alternative epis-
temic theory of democratic legitimacy that conceptually separates le-
gitimacy from any procedure-independent standard of correctness. 
Explicitly rejecting such a standard, Peter argues that even if there is 
no standard to judge the correctness of an outcome, epistemic values 
can be attributed to the procedure. Peter’s pure epistemic procedural-
ism holds that “legitimate decisions are those which are the result of 
deliberation under conditions of political and epistemic fairness” (Peter 
2008: 50). Thus, the legitimacy of decisions is solely a function of a fair 
deliberative procedure. There is no other standard for judging the le-
gitimacy of decisions, except the fairness of the procedure. It is defi ned 
as one that gives each deliberator an equal chance to express herself, 
and this opens the door to epistemic considerations.
These two theories represent two distinctive ways to conceptualize 
the relationship between democratic legitimacy and the epistemic val-
ues of public deliberation. Whereas Estlund’s theory posits the existence 
of a procedure-independent standard of correctness, as part of its le-
gitimacy, Peter’s view does not posit a procedure-independent standard 
of correctness. Both theories are necessary components of deliberative 
democracy literature. The deliberative democratic literature has “come 
of age” (Bohman 1998) and has now made a “systemic” turn.11 In the 
systemic turn, having two concepts of the epistemic value of public de-
liberation is useful. In some instances, deliberations will be conducive to 
generating reasons that can enlarge the range of reasons that are useful 
in a dialogue, without necessarily affecting the deliberative outcomes 
(Cohen 1997a). In this stage, the weak epistemic concept of public delib-
eration is operative and useful. In other instances, the goal is to track 
the truth, meaning whether some deliberative outcomes track empirical 
facts ‘on the ground’ or local practical truths. It gives us a ‘critical edge’ 
of democratic deliberation over other methods of fact-fi nding. Such an 
evaluation requires the strong epistemic concept of public deliberation. 
Thus, both epistemic concepts of public deliberation are useful to theo-
rize about the epistemic dimension of deliberative democracy.
At the same time, we cannot endorse both concepts without in-
consistency. The reason for this is that the strong and weak concepts 
are potentially inconsistent, for the former posits the procedure-inde-
pendent standard of correctness and the latter does not. This can be 
shown by examining three types of theories that combine procedural 
and epistemic dimensions of democratic legitimacy. First, pure epis-
temic proceduralism argues that legitimacy is a function of procedural 
fairness and the epistemic value of deliberation (Peter 2008). Second, 
perfect epistemic proceduralism asserts that outcomes are infallible, as 
11 For the systemic turn in deliberative democracy, see Mansbridge et. al. (2012) 
and Owen and Smith (2015) for reviews.
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judged by a procedure-independent standard (Rousseau 1984). Third, 
imperfect epistemic proceduralism argues that the procedure is likely 
to give correct outcomes though the procedure is fallible, as judged by 
a procedure-independent standard (Estlund 2008).
According to the perfect and imperfect proceduralist views of demo-
cratic legitimacy, the procedure-independent standard of correctness is 
necessary for the legitimacy of outcomes. On the other hand, according 
to the pure epistemic proceduralist view of democratic legitimacy, no 
procedure-independent standard of correctness is necessary to judge 
the outcome. Hence, Estlund’s and Peter’s views are both epistemic 
theories of democratic legitimacy, yet they differ on the role that the 
epistemic value of public deliberation plays in the process of justifi ca-
tion. To put it differently, according to Estlund’s view, the epistemic 
value of public deliberation entails that there is a correct answer, as 
judged by a procedure-independent standard. According to Peter’s 
view, the epistemic value of public deliberation entails that there is a 
correct answer, but the correct answer is intrinsic and constitutive of 
the procedure. In my view, both views are correct, yet they are inconsis-
tent views; that is, we cannot consistently endorse both imperfect pro-
cedural legitimacy and pure epistemic procedural legitimacy. Is there 
a way to resolve the tension?
The fi rst way to resolve the tension is to think of legitimacy pri-
marily as the legitimacy of the procedure (due to the procedure’s ten-
dency to get it correct), which then confers legitimacy on particular 
outcomes. Hence, the outcome legitimacy is a derivative of procedural 
legitimacy.12 This appears to be Estlund’s way of thinking.13 The basic 
idea here is that the legitimacy of democracy is a function of the pro-
cedure’s tendency to arrive at correct decisions and fair procedures. 
What confers legitimacy on individual outcomes of the jury trial is not 
the correctness of individual outcomes themselves, but the epistemic 
values of the jury trial – evidence gathering, testimony, fair trial, et 
cetera. These procedural elements are what confers legitimacy on in-
dividual decisions. Analogously, what confers legitimacy on individual 
outcomes in a democracy is not the quality of individual outcomes, but 
the democratic procedure – voting, deliberation among diverse perspec-
tives, and the like. Essentially, this is a two-level view: the procedure 
on the structural level enjoys imperfect procedural legitimacy, whereas 
outcomes enjoy purely procedural legitimacy.
The second way to resolve the tension between imperfect procedural 
legitimacy and pure procedural outcome legitimacy is “pure epistemic 
proceduralism.” Pure epistemic proceduralism argues that “legitimate 
decisions are those which are the result of deliberation under condi-
12 See Rehg (1997), for an explication of this view.
13 Estlund writes: “[Epistemic proceduralism] is a proceduralist view, linking 
legitimacy and authority of a decision to its procedural source and not to its 
substantive correctness” (Estlund 2008: 116).
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tions of political and epistemic fairness” but “legitimacy does not de-
pend on procedure-independent standards of correctness, or on their 
ability to contribute to the common good by solving social problems” 
(Peter 2008: 50). In other words, legitimate laws are solely a function 
of purely procedural considerations of political and epistemic fairness 
(Peter 2008, 2010).
My proposal then is to make a distinction between the two dimen-
sions of legitimate lawmaking that can accommodate both concepts of 
the epistemic value of public deliberation. This is proposed as an ecu-
menical move that can appeal to both views.
3. Two-dimensions of legitimate lawmaking
This section explains that there are two dimensions of legitimate law-
making. The fi rst dimension, the enactment dimension, is the process 
of laws’ enactment in a democracy. In this dimension, reasons for legal 
proposals are debated and traded. In formulating public opinions in the 
informal public sphere, every relevant viewpoint should be included 
in the discourse. Given that the norm of deliberation is the “forceless 
force of the better argument,”14 it is the job of the participants to sift 
reasons and weigh the evidence. It is also incumbent upon deliberators 
to fi lter reasons and viewpoints that are irrelevant to the discourse at 
hand. This process also includes the process of fi ltering of acceptable 
viewpoints entering the formal institutions of the state.
The second dimension is the process of evaluating the long-term 
consequences of laws. Our evaluation of injustice and oppression is 
sometimes attributed to the negative consequences. While the conse-
quences themselves are not strictly relevant to the legitimacy of laws, 
how the polity assesses and modifi es laws and policies have relevance 
to the legitimacy of laws.
Three points must be kept in mind. First, the distinction between 
enactment and long-run dimensions is analytical. The distinction may 
not always be cut and dry in the real-life decision-making process. Sec-
ond, the distinction between enactment and long-run dimensions is a 
temporal notion. Take a simple example: suppose Tom wants to lose 
weight and adopts a workout regimen. After six months of working 
out, Tom lost 20 pounds. Whether the workout regimen works can be 
judged in retrospect. Just in the same way, lawmaking has a temporal 
dimension. Before the law is enacted at time t1, the law goes through 
whatever deliberative and democratic process it needs to go through. 
14 This phrase is originated by Jürgen Habermas in various places, but here 
is a direct passage from his (1999) paper.  He writes that the discourse, “which 
is supposed to be public and inclusive, to grant equal communication rights for 
participants, to require sincerity and to diffuse any kind of force other than the 
forceless force of the better argument. This communicative structure is expected to 
create a deliberative space for the mobilization of the best available contributions for 
the most relevant topics” (Habermas 1999: 3).
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Later, at t2 the effects of laws on citizen attitude, reduction of harm, 
or the promotion of well-being have become evident. If citizens see 
at time t2 that the law enacted at t1 reduces harm, then we would 
judge that law to be working well; on the contrary, if citizens see at 
time t2 that the law enacted at t1 increases harm, then we would judge 
that the law works poorly.
Third, there is a dynamic relationship between the enactment and 
long-run phases of lawmaking. That is, the lawmaking process is not 
merely one-directional – the lawmaking progression goes from enact-
ment to the long run – but there is a dynamic relationship between the 
two. According to Anderson,
[V]oting and deliberation represent alternating moments in a continuous 
process of provisional decision-making, the aim of which is simultaneously 
to learn about what works and to decide upon criteria of what counts as 
working from the perspective of citizens acting and thinking collectively. 
Decisions are provisional and continuously subject to revision in light of 
feedback from citizens about their consequences. (Anderson 2009: 217)
Citizens give justifi cations for endorsing a policy by providing publicly 
acceptable reasons. But a democratic society also does not consider 
the matter settled even after we provide justifi cations. That is because 
circumstances change, cultures change, and social values and norms 
change.15 When they do, democratic citizens should provide reasons for 
the change, and debate whether the change is desirable. Similarly, in-
telligent policy and lawmaking require that we anticipate the likely 
consequences of collective action. Continually revising the means-end 
relationship in policymaking is one way to accomplish that goal.
If the distinction between two concepts of epistemic value of pub-
lic deliberation and two phases of legitimate decision-making holds, 
then we should re-conceptualize the relation between epistemic values 
of democracy and democratic legitimacy. I begin with the strategy of 
combining the weak concept of the epistemic value of public delibera-
tion and legitimacy at enactment in the next section, and the following 
section combines the strong concept of the epistemic value of public 
deliberation and legitimacy in the long run. Let me start with the fi rst 
strategy.
4. The weak concept of the epistemic value of public 
deliberation and legitimacy at the enactment
This section argues that the legitimacy of laws at enactment is primar-
ily a function of what survives a deliberative procedure. I offer four 
reasons to support this conclusion. First, a deliberative procedure has 
weak epistemic values if an exchange of reasons is public knowledge 
among all citizens. A deliberative procedure is fair when citizens’ in-
15 While moral norms are valid from a universal point of view and transcend 
historical time and social space, I think political and ethical norms are historical 
and contextual.
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terests, voices, and perspectives are considered in the opinion-and-
will-formation processes in relevant ways. In addition to procedural 
fairness, inclusion is also a constitutive feature of the deliberative pro-
cedure. Inclusion typically refers to the all-affected principle, where 
all those affected by collective decisions must have the opportunity to 
provide input (Goodin 2007). The all-affected principle emphasizes the 
dynamic aspects of the constitution of the public, and thus “serves to 
take normative command of a situation of plural and competing alle-
giances” (Näsström 2011: 123; Young 2000; Dryzek 2010).
Besides the normative dimension of inclusion, a deliberative pro-
cedure also has weak epistemic values. Every citizen occupies some 
social space. Occupying social space from an isolated corner of exis-
tence garners only a narrow understanding of the complexity of how 
the world is constituted. Citizens, because of their life histories and 
stories, have much to offer in fi lling in the content of perspectives. This 
perspectival knowledge comes from occupying social space and func-
tioning, occupation, gender roles, religious affi liation, and so forth. By 
learning from differently situated others, citizens collectively come to 
an enlarged understanding of the social world. It means that social 
knowledge is not something that one individual or social group can 
achieve by themselves. Social knowledge is possible only through the 
pooling of diversely situated knowledge. Hence, social knowledge is 
achievable only within the context of an inclusive deliberative process 
among diverse perspectives. It is through the process of justifying one’s 
reasons to others that creates a diverse pool of perspectives. Since citi-
zens come from different backgrounds and life situations, such a de-
liberative process will result in having a diverse pool of perspectives. 
The pooling of situated perspectives then allows us to have a mutual 
understanding of ideas about the world that everyone dwells in togeth-
er.16 Notice here that the social knowledge gained through deliberation 
is not a set of fi xed points that can be gotten through an impartial 
deliberation.  Rather, social knowledge is constructed through delibera-
tion, meaning that social knowledge is not something that exists before 
deliberation; social knowledge is discovered or constructed through de-
liberation. Moreover, ends are not fi xed points, but they are revisable 
through deliberation. Social knowledge and objectivity are, therefore, 
the product of system-wide deliberation among free and equal citizens. 
Thus, a deliberative procedure has weak epistemic values if the process 
of reason-giving is a public knowledge among all citizens.
Second, the epistemic value of public deliberation that fl ows out of 
the deliberative procedure generates a public understanding of citizens’ 
reasons and interests by political and epistemic agents. Citizens are not 
only political agents, insofar as they have certain specifi ed rights and 
duties associated with citizenship, but they are also epistemic agents. 
That is, citizens usually possess politically relevant practical knowl-
16 I draw from Young (2000), Chapters 3 and 4.
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edge. Firstly, citizens possess knowledge about their “enlightened in-
terests” – their self-interests and how to execute them.17 Secondly, citi-
zens have to know they can make relevant contributions to a discourse. 
Sometimes citizens do not know that they can contribute. Many citi-
zens are oppressed, due to poverty, institutional racism, and marginal-
ization. Because of that long-standing oppression, they do not believe 
that they have anything to offer. Hence, knowing that one is able and 
entitled to contribute to discourse is crucial. Moreover, citizens have to 
know that their contribution can be relevant to a discourse. This takes 
some skills as a citizen because it is not immediately obvious when 
one has a relevant contribution.18 Thirdly, they have factual knowledge 
arising from one’s social roles. For example, an employee at Wal-Mart 
making the minimum wage knows that he cannot survive on that wage 
even if he works 40 hours. This information seems politically relevant 
because it will be helpful to know whether the minimum wage is a sus-
tainable wage for workers in a location.
Given these thre e kinds of politically relevant knowledge, the po-
litical and epistemic inclusion as a procedure is a way in which we 
respect citizens as political and epistemic agents. This expresses the 
value of the procedural principle of political and epistemic inclusion: 
we ought to appreciate that citizens are political and epistemic agents 
and they ought to be respected as such. In other words, citizens should 
be respected as political and epistemic agents and not merely for the 
instrumental epistemic benefi ts of arriving at correct outcomes.
Third, a deliberative procedure that has the weak epistemic value 
of public deliberation not only generates a public understanding of rea-
sons as political and epistemic agents, but it also generates mutual 
respect. Having one’s voice heard is a way of being respected. On the 
individual agency level, one feels respected when someone listens to 
their concerns, and their reasons are considered and listened to. Any 
mature person knows that one cannot get one’s way all the time or even 
most of the time. However, having one’s voice heard with sincerity by 
others is enough sometimes. Conversely, not having my voice heard is 
a sign of disrespect and non-recognition.
Fourth, laws produced by a deliberative procedure are likely to 
be reasonably acceptable to all citizens at the moment of enactment. 
Because reasons have been discussed and traded in the deliberative 
process, one can reasonably accept the outcome if one’s reasons are dis-
cussed and not lightly dismissed. That is, human beings have a right 
to justifi cation. The right to justifi cation entails that it is procedurally 
required to have a right to have a say and listened to, but it does not 
mean that they will be taken into consideration. Thus, our right to 
17 See Mill (1991) for a discussion about the enlightened interests of the citizens. 
18 The connection between this sentence to epistemic injustice is salient, though 
it is outside the scope of this paper. See Fricker (2007) and Fricker (2015) for 
discussion about epistemic injustice.
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justifi cation is suffi cient, sometimes, for our acceptance of the outcome. 
Premises three and four are crucial steps in my argument. Fairness 
and inclusion are not only procedural values, but they are also epis-
temic values. The epistemic values are constitutive of the procedure 
and not independent of them. Stated differently, we should not divorce 
the procedural values of fairness and inclusion from their epistemic 
features. It means that a procedure has constitutive epistemic fea-
tures, but we should conceptually separate the procedure-independent 
standard of correctness from the meaning of epistemic. Thus, laws are 
likely to be acceptable to all citizens because everyone’s opinions, per-
spectives, and interests were considered. This last point will be contro-
versial, so let me explain.
The reason why the acceptability of laws is dependent on the inclu-
sion of everyone’s perspectives is that our normative attitude against 
laws is a function of mutual respect. The principle of mutual respect ex-
plains the normative attitudes against the acceptability of laws. One’s 
normative attitude against laws is that if one’s voice was respectfully 
considered, then one will likely accept the law’s legitimacy. Even if one 
disagrees, the public nature of the deliberative procedure will inform 
that one’s reasons have been considered. Sometimes, it is the prospect 
of being listened to and taken seriously rather than the outcome them-
selves. Thus, what matters primarily is the procedure, not the substan-
tive or epistemic features.
This normative point about mutual respect can be linked up with 
empirical fi ndings in the social psychology of procedural justice (Lind 
and Tyler 1988). The basic idea behind the research is this: it is widely 
presumed that “outcome justice” – people’s attitude towards the justice 
of outcomes – is suffi cient to motivate people to comply with fair out-
comes. But the motivation behind procedural justice is that fair process 
is important, and in some cases, it is more important than the outcome. 
The process is important because, in a good process, people feel that 
they have been treated fairly; they feel like the process is fairer; that, 
in turn, could increase their satisfaction with the outcome, whether 
favorable or not (Delli Carpini et. al. 2004: 327). Allan Lind and Tom 
Tyler describe the intuition behind this thinking by recounting a story:
Judges in that [traffi c court in the city of Chicago] often take the view that 
showing up for court and losing a day’s pay at work is punishment enough 
or a traffi c offense.  As a result, those who arrive in court often have their 
case dismissed without any hearing. From a defendant’s perspective this is 
a good outcome—the defendant pays no fi ne, does not go to jail, and has no 
violation record.  However, interviews with traffi c court defendants suggest 
that despite these favorable outcomes they often leave the court dissatis-
fi ed.  For example, one woman showed up for court with photographs that 
she felt showed that a sign warning her not to make an illegal turn was not 
clearly visible. After her case was dismissed (a victory!) she was angry and 
expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the court (as well as making 
several unfl attering remarks about the judge). (Lind and Tyler 1988: 2)
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Lind and Tyler go on to say that the outcome-based models “might fi nd 
the woman’s dissatisfaction diffi cult to explain, but process-based mod-
els would have little trouble in accounting for her reaction: the woman 
felt angry because the outcome she received was not arrived at using a 
procedure that met her standards of proper judicial process” (Lind and 
Tyler 1988: 2). This kind of judgment and intuition has been mostly 
studied in law, but the authors argue that it is generalizable to other 
areas of social interactions including politics and lawmaking (Lind and 
Tyler 1988: chapters 6 and 7).
This empirical evidence demonstrates that the woman cared more 
about how she was treated by the judge than the favorable outcome. Al-
though Lind and Tyler do not quite put it this way, we can reasonably 
say that the woman felt disrespected for not being able to present her 
case to the judge. Sometimes, resolving one’s grievances in the right 
sort of way is equally important as having a favorable outcome.
One might question the validity of the analogical argument between 
procedural justice and the women’s grievance and the weak epistemic 
value of public deliberation and legitimacy at enactment. It is a bad 
analogy, one might argue, because the woman felt grieved because the 
procedure lacked some procedure-independent epistemic qualities such 
as judicial review.19 In response, the source of the woman’s anger and 
dissatisfaction arose from the fact that the procedure lacked some pro-
cedural qualities, not because the procedure was missing some proce-
dure-independent epistemic quality. She felt angry, and the source of 
her dissatisfaction with the court was that she was not able to express 
herself to the judge, even if the decision was made in her favor. In other 
words, the reason why she was angry and dissatisfi ed was that she was 
not heard, despite the favorable outcome. Being able to express one’s 
grief and grievances is one of the rights provided to citizens, at least in 
the United States. Thus, several notable institutions make hearings, 
both formal and informal, possible on many levels of government. For 
instance, one can appeal their social security benefi ts with the United 
States government through a congressional or senate fi eld offi ce. One 
can partake in public hearings on government projects.
This section argued that the legitimacy of laws at enactment is pri-
marily a function of what survives a deliberative procedure. A delibera-
tive procedure has weak epistemic values if an exchange of reasons is 
public knowledge among all citizens. It generates an understanding of 
the reasons for citizens as political and epistemic agents. An inclusive 
procedure that is weakly epistemic not only garners an understand-
ing of reasons as political and epistemic agents, but it also generates 
mutual respect. Thus, laws produced by the deliberative procedure are 
legitimate at enactment when binding enforceability is reasonably ac-
ceptable to all citizens.
19 See Goldman (2001) about the role of expertise in democratic societies.
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5. The strong concept of the epistemic value 
of public deliberation and long-run legitimacy
The previous section has argued that the legitimacy of laws at enact-
ment is primarily a function of what survives a robust deliberative pro-
cedure. In this section, I argue that the legitimacy of laws, in the long 
run, is a function of their consequences as evaluated by a procedure-
independent standard of correctness. I offer four reasons for this con-
clusion.
Firstly, a deliberative procedure has strong epistemic values if a 
procedure-independent standard of correctness is part of its evaluation 
of laws. Recall that the strong epistemic value of public deliberation 
implies that we cannot separate the epistemic values from a procedure-
independent standard.
 Secondly, although laws surviving a deliberative procedure are le-
gitimate at enactment, laws must be evaluated for their long-run con-
sequences. There are two reasons why the evaluation of the long-term 
success of decisions should be part of their legitimacy. The fi rst reason 
is that we will not know which laws are best or better until they hold 
up in practice in the long run. Because of the fallibility of human cogni-
tion and human institutions, and historical lessons of the past, we do 
not know what the effects of a legal-political outcome would be until 
its enactment. Evaluation of the long-term success of laws requires the 
knowledge of the consequences of enacting a policy or law (both in-
tended and unintended but foreseeable), attitudes of citizens toward 
the law, as well as effects on institutions, practices, social conditions, 
and social dynamics. The importance of this knowledge is that laws 
and policies affect citizens in consequential ways. Laws have effects 
(good, bad, or neutral); laws can benefi t or harm its citizens living un-
der them. Even if one accepts my argument that the long-run success 
of laws matter, the controversial step in my argument will be whether 
the legitimacy of laws has anything to do with their long-run success.
This leads us to a second consideration that political justifi cation is 
provisional. Amy Gutmann explains the provisional nature of political 
justifi cation:
[T]he legitimate exercise of political authority requires justifi cation to those 
people who are bound by it, and decision-making by deliberation among 
free and equal citizens is the most defensible justifi cation anyone has to 
offer for provisionally settling controversial issues…[t]he fi rst advantage 
of deliberative democracy [against competing defenses of democracy] is its 
recognition of the provisional nature of justifi cation in politics. The empiri-
cal and moral understandings of citizens change not only over time and 
social space but also by virtue of deliberative interchange, the give-and-take 
of sometimes complementary, often confl icting, political insights and argu-
ments. (Gutmann 1996: 344)
Deliberative democracy holds that one of the central criteria of legiti-
macy is mutual justifi cation among free and equal citizens (Chambers 
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2003; Lafont 2014; Thompson 2008). The coercive nature of political 
authority has to be justifi ed vertically from the state to citizens and 
horizontally between citizens by giving reasons for why one endorses 
such a policy. Public reasons, or publicly justifi able reasons, are in-
formed by cultural differences and changes, changes, in fact, social val-
ues, and changes in social norms. When those changes occur, as they 
inevitably do over time, democratic citizens should debate whether the 
change is desirable.
The theoretical basi s of this is the ideals of dissent. Dissent is a 
contestatory mechanism to protect minority rights against the possi-
bility of the tyranny of the majority. It also enables citizens to combat 
unjust and unintelligent laws. In liberal democratic societies like the 
United States, for example, there are periodic elections on both federal 
and local levels to ensure the possibility of repealing laws. While those 
feedback mechanisms of liberal democracy are institutional safeguards 
against the majority’s tyranny, such liberal mechanisms (guaranteed 
through the constitution) are not enough. Deliberative democrats usu-
ally go one step further to emphasize the constitutive importance of 
contestation. Because deliberation is essentially open-ended, any pol-
icy option or choice can be contested from a variety of perspectives. In 
short, a democratic society does not consider the matter settled once 
justifi cations are given.
Thirdly, the evaluation of the long-run consequences requires a 
procedure-independent standard. There are two reasons for this. First, 
politics entails deep moral disagreements. These moral disagreements 
are not merely confl icts of power, desire, or preference. They are some-
times disagreements in worldviews, philosophies, and ideologies. Ad-
judicating them requires some standard as to which choices are more 
or less superior. That evaluation makes little sense if we do not posit 
that there are some standards by which we evaluate solutions based on 
some procedure-independent standard of correctness. Suppose public 
deliberation does not aim at truth from some procedure-independent 
standard of correctness. When there is a political disagreement we 
would not even be able to inquire whether X’s position or Y’s position 
is correct. If that evaluation cannot be had, then the disagreement be-
comes X’s expressing X’s desires and preferences and Y’s expressing 
Y’s desires and preferences. Thus, deliberation reduces down to a mere 
power struggle. In cases of minor disputes – whether to give to the 
Catholic Charities or the Oxfam or to serve strawberry or chocolate ice 
cream at the local fundraising—X’s desire and Y’s desire can be sub-
ject to reasonable disagreement. In cases of major disputes, however, 
we should be able to say X is correct, and Y is incorrect. For example, 
in our deliberation about whether the drone attacks are a justifi able 
form of killing, we should be able in principle to judge that X’s posi-
tion is correct, and Y’s position is incorrect. If it were not possible to 
say X is correct, and Y is incorrect, then there would be little reason to 
482 J. B. Min, Two Concepts of the Epistemic Value of Deliberation
deliberate. Therefore, public deliberation must aim at truth from some 
procedure-independent standard of correctness.
Second, a procedure-independent standard is necessary to judge 
whether the outcome is good or not. That evaluation requires some 
procedure-independent standard of correctness. Some laws are morally 
weightier than others for sure, but it seems undeniable that all laws 
are subject to evaluation. Law’s effi cacy, which is an evaluation of the 
law’s success or failure, depends on some objective standard, in the 
sense that there are measurable consequences independently of an ac-
tual procedure or a current consensus. In other words, the amelioration 
of the present condition requires an objective standard for evaluation. 
The provisional nature of political justifi cation provides a norma-
tive reason why collective outcome should be subject to continual and 
ongoing justifi cation, especially when the law fails to serve the shared 
interests of all citizens. Although laws and policies surviving a robust 
deliberative procedure are legitimate laws at enactment, we will not 
know which laws are best until they hold up in practice in the long run. 
The evaluation of which have long term success requires a retrospec-
tive judgment. Making a retrospective judgment about the long-term 
success of a legal-political outcome involves the strong epistemic values 
of democracy – democracy tending to produce substantially correct de-
cisions judged from a procedure-independent standard of correctness. 
If my argument is on track, then we should consider the long-run suc-
cess of laws in legitimizing collective outcomes.
This section has argued that the legitimacy of laws, in the long run, 
is primarily a function of satisfying the epistemic criteria of evaluation 
of consequences. To support this conclusion, I have argued that a delib-
erative procedure has strong epistemic values if a procedure-indepen-
dent standard of correctness is part of its evaluation of laws. Although 
laws surviving a deliberative procedure are legitimate at enactment, 
we must evaluate laws’ long-run consequences. The evaluation of the 
long-run consequences requires a procedure-independent standard.
6. Answering objections
Before concluding, I wish to address four objections. First, one might 
object that the two-dimensional analysis of democratic legitimacy is a 
form of democratic instrumentalism or consequentialism about demo-
cratic legitimacy. To say that the legitimacy of outcomes must be evalu-
ated against some standard is to invoke democratic instrumentalism. 
My response is that the second phase of legitimate law-making is close-
ly related to democratic instrumentalism because it argues that citizen 
acceptance of laws and policies are dependent on their long-run effec-
tiveness. But my view is not merely democratic instrumentalism be-
cause the fi rst dimension of legitimate lawmaking is a version of pure 
proceduralism about legitimacy. After all, there is no need to appeal to 
legal or political consequences in citizen acceptance of policies. 
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Second, s ome might object that some laws could be legitimate or il-
legitimate a priori. That is, some laws legitimate or illegitimate, at the 
time of their enactment, regardless of their consequences. Some laws 
are illegitimate because they violate individual liberty or freedom. For 
instance, one might argue that laws that permit discrimination based 
on one’s race or gender are illegitimate regardless of knowing their con-
sequences. If this objection works, then it would undermine the thesis 
that some deliberative outcomes change its legitimacy status as time 
goes on.
While I grant that some laws could be legitimate or illegitimate a 
priori, we can question the legitimacy of some laws once the long-run 
consequences of laws become known. Let me offer a real-life example to 
articulate this point.
The 18th amendment prohibited alcohol consumption and distribu-
tion.20 There are various political and social impetuses behind Prohibi-
tion. On the political front, thirteen states by 1850 had enacted alcohol 
prohibition legislation. Also prominent in this period was the single-is-
sue lobbying of the Anti-Saloon League (ASL). ASL’s powerful presence 
at the national level brought about a social and cultural shift in the per-
ception of alcohol. Once the “[p]rohibition became the law of the land, 
many citizens decided to obey it. Referendum results from the imme-
diate post-Volstead showed widespread support” (Blocker 2006: 237). 
However, once the negative consequences of Prohibition became widely 
known, the law began to lose its popular support, eventually leading to 
its appeal in 1933. The Daily Mirror, on the cover page of December 5, 
1933, showed men holding beers to celebrate: “PROHIBITION ENDS 
AT LAST.” Although the 18th amendment that made alcohol prohibi-
tion lawful was a legitimate law at enactment, as the time progressed, 
the law began to lose its popular support once the consequences of the 
law began to be known. This example demonstrates the thesis of this 
paper. The legitimacy of laws at enactment is primarily a function of 
what survives a robust deliberative procedure, whereas the legitimacy 
of laws, in the long run, depends on their epistemic correctness.
Third, one might argue that the above argument rests on a con-
troversial assumption that the law’s qualities will be so clear that all 
citizens will be able to perceive it as correct or incorrect. This assump-
tion is necessary for the argument to work, yet controversial and prob-
lematic. There are two ways to understand the objection. First, there 
is a distinction between the law’s correctness and citizens’ perception 
of the law’s correctness. So, it is possible that citizens can be mistaken 
about the correctness of the laws, or refuse to accept the correctness 
because of their ideological delusion or something else. Second, there 
20 The National Prohibition Act of 1919, the 18th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, states that “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United 
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is 
hereby prohibited (U.S. Constitution).
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can be reasonable disagreement about the correctness of laws and poli-
cies. Rawls (1993) famously argued that the modern world is character-
ized by reasonable pluralism and that there are bound to be reasonable 
disagreements on comprehensive doctrines. The best we can do in a 
modern polity is to seek overlapping consensus on constitutional essen-
tials and matters of justice. Here, Estlund’s view is different from Raw-
ls’s in one respect: while Rawls believes that there will be reasonable 
disagreements on most things, Estlund believes that there will be no 
reasonable disagreements (qualifi ed points of view) about some things. 
This is what he calls the “primary bads.” Genocide and slavery are 
not subject to reasonable disagreement, and all qualifi ed points of view 
would agree that they are bad. He argues that democratic procedures 
can avoid these things better than other fair and inclusive procedures.
I agree with Estlund that some laws and policies should be ruled 
as bad and there are procedure-independent epistemic qualities about 
them. However, for most laws and policies, what counts as reasonable 
disagreement, if there are reasonable disagreements, cannot be ruled 
out ex-ante. Thus, we should follow the deliberative process at least on 
most issues to clarify what the reasonable disagreement entails. Thus, 
at the moment of enactment of laws, citizens could reasonably agree 
that the law had followed procedural steps, but the reasonable disagree-
ment comes ex post facto. To further articulate this point, consider the 
“War on Drugs” in the United States. By most accounts, the “War on 
Drugs” in the United States is an abject failure (Wacquant 2012). The 
law does not reduce the supply of drugs nor prevent people from using 
drugs. The enforcement of drug law is costly; the federal government 
spends billions of dollars. There is an overfl ow of non-violent offend-
ers in federal prisons; human capital is sacrifi ced because people in 
prison cannot vote, work, nor contribute to society; and social capital is 
decimated in some subsections of the population. According to the So-
ciologist Loic Wacquant, African-American males are most profoundly 
affected by this law for three reasons: they are excluded from the edu-
cation system, including higher education (cultural capital), from jobs 
and social mobility (social redistribution), and the voting booth (politi-
cal participation) (Wacquant 2012: 57–8). The lesson is that the abject 
failure of one law has caused (either directly or indirectly) tremendous 
suffering for those affected by it.
Now, what reasons do African-Americans (or anyone else) have 
for accepting the legitimacy of the drug law? The drug law may have 
been legitimately made at enactment – it went through proper consti-
tutional, legislative, and deliberative channels. If so, then the binding 
enforceability would be reasonably acceptable to all. But people still 
deem the law a failure. The reason why people complain about the law 
is not its enactment illegitimacy, but the law had ill-effects and does 
not accord with our sense of justice. The unjust treatment of and the 
exclusion of a large segment of the population fails to track the in-
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terests and ideas of those suffering the consequences. In short, if “the 
legitimate exercise of political authority requires justifi cation to those 
people who are bound by it,” then the drug law is no longer one of the 
instances of the legitimate exercise of political authority. The drug law 
cannot be justifi ed to those people who are bound by it, and people may 
reasonably reject the law as illegitimate.21
Fourth, the above example involving the drug law, one might object, 
brings out an ambiguity between normative and descriptive uses of 
legitimacy in this paper. Normative legitimacy means the moral per-
missibility to enforce a system of rules through coercion, whereas de-
scriptive legitimacy is the psychological acceptance of a ruling regime. 
Philosophers make a sharp distinction between normative and descrip-
tive legitimacy in their discussions. While I accept the distinction, the 
normative status of the legitimacy of a law is affected by the long-term 
consequences of law and citizens’ reasonable disagreements and psy-
chological attitudes and acceptance towards the law. If the outcome 
were shown to be bad over time, then citizens would have reasons to 
reject it as illegitimate. These two factors are not suffi cient to overturn 
the normative status of legitimacy. Nonetheless, those two factors give 
us reasons for thinking that the long-run negative consequences and 
people’s attitudes and confi dence and trust of a system of rule erode 
and weakens.
7. Conclusion
This paper made the relevant distinctions between the strong and weak 
concepts of the epistemic value of public deliberation and linked those 
concepts to two dimensions of legitimate lawmaking. If my ecumenical 
approach to democratic legitimacy is on the right track, then both pure 
epistemic proceduralists and epistemic proceduralists can endorse my 
theory. Pure epistemic proceduralists can accept that a deliberative 
procedure is weakly epistemic and is most applicable in the enactment 
phase of the legitimate lawmaking process. Epistemic proceduralists, 
on the other hand, can adopt the strong epistemic values of public de-
liberation, which serves as a benchmark of knowing when and how 
improvements are made.22
21 This is from a normative standpoint. It is a different story about whether 
people comply with the law. People may comply because of the fear of punishment or 
being ostracized. Furthermore, I am not arguing that all unjust laws are immediate 
grounds for non-compliance. But I think some laws are so unjust that it is reasonable 
for the citizens not to comply.
22 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on 
the previous version of this paper.
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